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BREAKING THE CYCLE: HOW NEVADA 
CAN EFFECTUATE MEANINGFUL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 
Nevada Law Journal Staff 
INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge 
Freedom: For in all the states of created beings capable of Laws, where there 
is no Law, there is no Freedom.”1 
The scope and purpose of this paper can be summed up with one simple 
question: “Why does society punish criminals?” More specifically, this paper 
will examine what Nevada is attempting to accomplish through enacting and 
enforcing its criminal laws. However, due to the nuanced and complicated 
scope of the topic of criminal justice, it is important to establish a common 
frame of reference to which readers can refer back—namely, that we have de-
cided to evaluate Nevada’s criminal justice system through a utilitarian lens. 
There are several theories of criminal justice that attempt to provide expla-
nations for how and when society is justified in depriving individuals of their 
natural rights to life, liberty, or property. One train of thought is called retribu-
tive justice, which—although there are several sub-theories within this school 
of thought—generally posits that individuals who violate society’s rules or laws 
deserve punishment because they have committed a moral evil.2 Every revenge 
story is based on this idea of retributive justice.3 
In contrast, under utilitarian theories punishment is only justified when the 
overall ‘pain’ it causes is outweighed by the benefits it provides society as a 
 
  This White Paper was written by Scott Cooper, Forum Editor, and Scott Whitworth, Ne-
vada Law Editor, with contributions in drafting, editing, and researching by Anna Guida, 
Jess Agostino, Amanda Stafford, and Artie Burns. We would also like to thank Assembly-
man Steve Yeager, Chief Justice Mark Gibbons, and Justice Elissa Cadish for their support 
and contribution in topic selection and research. 
1  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2003) (1690). 
2  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 18 (8th ed. 2018). 
3  Think of the character Inigo Montoya in William Goldman’s, “The Princess Bride.” See 
generally THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications 1987). After witnessing the ‘six-
fingered man’ murder his father in cold blood, Inigo spends his entire life seeking to avenge 
his father’s death to (in his eyes) right a moral wrong. Id. 
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whole.4 Some of the ‘benefits’ of criminal punishment often used to justify 
punishments instituted under the law are: deterrence, which is the idea that in-
dividuals will not engage in illegal conduct to avoid the prescribed punishment; 
incapacitation, or removing dangerous individuals from society to prevent them 
from causing further harm; and rehabilitation, which is the idea that punishment 
can be used to teach or ‘reform’ individuals so they will not continue to engage 
in conduct deemed ‘wrong’ by society.5 
While these two theories of criminal justice are undoubtedly (and often un-
consciously) on the minds of both lawmakers and everyday citizens, to create 
an effective and just criminal justice system, it is paramount to determine the 
why behind our criminal laws. While each theory has its merits, in a society 
made up of (and arguably becoming more inclusive of) diverse cultures, reli-
gions, and philosophies, what is considered a ‘moral wrong’ is often ambiguous 
at best6—which calls the validity and legitimacy of retributive justice in mod-
ern society into question.7 For purposes of this paper, we chose to examine Ne-
vada’s criminal justice system through the lens of the utilitarian theory of jus-
tice. The analyses, critiques, and suggestions in this paper all come back to the 
fundamental utilitarian calculus of whether Nevada’s criminal laws effectively 
maximize the “net happiness of society”8—and if they don’t—what can be 
changed to effectively reach that result. 
This paper proceeds in two parts. Part I will explore the current state of, as 
well as the challenges facing, Nevada’s criminal justice system. First, we exam-
ine current and projected criminal statistics and trends in Nevada, including the 
State’s ever-increasing incarceration rate, recidivism, and fiscal costs associat-
ed with imprisonment. We then turn to the most recent piece of criminal legis-
lation passed by the 2019 Nevada Legislature, Assembly Bill 236 (AB 236), 
which attempted to address some of these issues. Specifically, we identify the 
 
4  DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 16–17. 
5  Id. at 17. 
6  By way of illustration, think of the moral stances and beliefs of the devout evangelical 
Christian as opposed to the staunch atheist. While the two would undoubtedly share some 
‘moral’ commonalities (e.g., it is ‘wrong’ to kill another human being without provocation) 
their reasoning and justification for their respective stances will likely be at odds (i.e., killing 
is a violation of God’s natural law vs. the notion that human beings’ shared (and unique) 
abilities to reason purports that “the mass of mankind has not been born, with saddles on 
their backs”). See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger Chew Weightman (June 24, 1826) 
(reprinted in Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-6179 [https://perma.cc/A7J8-
KVJ8] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020)). Therefore, basing the validity and legitimacy of socie-
ty’s criminal laws on the unlikely consensus of these two hypothetical individuals is ineffi-
cient at best—and impossible at worst. In an infinitely more complex modern society with—
not two—but thousands of moral belief sets, it is more practical to measure the efficacy of a 
criminal justice system using an objective utilitarian calculus. 
7  We admit that a discussion on the merits of retributive justice in modern society deserves a 
more in-depth conversation, which cannot adequately be explored in this paper. 
8  See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 16. 
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important first steps that AB 236 took toward making Nevada’s criminal justice 
system more utilitarian. 
Part II of this paper identifies and proposes certain solutions to reduce both 
recidivism and the financial burden that incarceration imposes on the state by 
looking to best practices in other states, as well as certain mechanisms and pro-
visions that were, for one reason or another, removed from AB 236. First, we 
identify certain crimes whose current statutory structure and application by law 
enforcement and courts suggest they are motivated by retributive justice (i.e., a 
desire to simply punish), rather than a desire to obtain a favorable result for the 
offender and society. We then make suggestions of how these crimes could be 
modified and adjusted to be more consistent with a utilitarian model of justice. 
Second, we propose certain ‘front-end solutions,’ such as sentencing diversion 
programs using specialty courts. 
I. CHALLENGES FACING NEVADA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. Problems Facing Nevada 
Nevada is currently amid a prison population boom. From 1980 to 2016, 
Nevada’s prison population grew from about 2,000 inmates to nearly 14,000, a 
staggering 648 percent increase.9 During this same period, Nevada’s population 
only grew by 255 percent.10 From 1980 to the mid 2000s, rising prison popula-
tions were the norm for the rest of the country, but over the last decade states 
have started to adopt policies to reverse this trend.11 But not in Nevada. Since 
2009, Nevada’s prison population has grown by 7 percent, leaving the state 
with the fifteenth highest incarceration rate in the country.12 
As a result of these disturbing trends, then-Governor Sandoval, then-Senate 
Majority Leader Ford, Speaker Frierson, and then-Chief Justice Douglas di-
rected the Advisory Commission on the Administration of Justice (ACAJ) to 
review the state’s criminal justice system.13 The ACAJ analyzed “Nevada’s 
sentencing and community supervision data, compared the state’s policies and 
procedures with nationally recognized best practices, and reviewed the latest 
research on reducing recidivism and improving public safety.”14 The ACAJ 
found that these figures were largely driven by increases in (1) the number of 
people failing on community supervision, and (2) the average length of time 
 
9  NEV. ADVISORY COMM’N ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE: 
FINAL REPORT 9 (2019) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. at 7. 
12  Id. at 9. 
13  Press Release, Len Engel, Dir. of Policy & Campaigns, Crime & Justice Inst., Nevada 
Legislature Advances Major Criminal Justice Reform (June 3, 2019) (available at 
http://www.crj.org/assets/2019/06/Crime-and-Justice-Institute-Statement-on-AB236.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5Q59-ZXL7]). 
14  Id. 
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served.15 In 2017, 39 percent of prison admissions resulted from an individual 
failing on community supervision.16 Of these community supervision failures, 
34 percent of these offenders were admitted to prison on technical violations.17 
A technical violation could be failing a drug test, missing a meeting with a pro-
bation officer, or any other supervision violation that does not rise to the level 
of new criminal conduct or absconding.18 The number of individuals admitted 
to prison for probation violations has increased by 15 percent over the past dec-
ade despite an overall decline in the state’s probation population.19 Additional-
ly, the average length of a prisoner’s sentence increased 20 percent during this 
same time.20 The ACAJ found that prisoners released from direct prison sen-
tences in 2017 had “served[,] on average, nearly seven months longer than 
[prisoners] released in 2012.”21 
Another important factor that increased the size of Nevada’s prison popula-
tion is the state’s high rate of incarceration versus community supervision. In 
2016 in Nevada, 52 percent of individuals serving their sentences were incar-
cerated while 48 percent were on some form of community supervision.22 Sig-
nificantly higher percentages of offenders are incarcerated in Nevada than 
across the country. Nationally, only 31 percent of offenders are incarcerated, 
and 69 percent are on community supervision.23 Additionally, more offenders 
entering the prison system are non-violent and first-time offenders. According 
to the ACAJ’s statistical research, in 2017, 66 percent of the offenders admitted 
to Nevada prisons committed non-person offenses.24 Non-person offenses tradi-
tionally include non-violent offenses such as property crimes and drug crimes 
like simple possession of a controlled substance.25 Conversely, the Nevada De-
partment of Corrections (NDOC) defines person offenses as violent or sexual 
crimes, or as offenses that “involve[e] harm or injury.”26 Of these non-person 
offenders entering Nevada prisons, 40 percent had no prior felony record.27 
Based on these figures it is clear that a significant portion of Nevada’s prison 
population is made up of non-violent first-time offenders. 
 
15  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 13. 
16  Id. at 9. 
17  Id. at 4, 13. 
18  Id. at 13. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. (looking at figures for offenders sent directly to prison, as opposed to offenders sent to 
prison for violations of probation or other terms of community supervision). 
22  Id. at 10. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. at 11. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. Within this bucket of non-offenders, 37 percent were property offenders, and 41 per-
cent were drug offenders. Id. 
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The incarceration of so many non-violent, first-time felons obviously raises 
questions about how so many of these people end up in prison. One of the driv-
ing factors is the lack of alternatives to incarceration available in Nevada.28 For 
most felony offenders the only two options available are incarceration or proba-
tion.29 One reason for Nevada’s high incarceration rate is that Nevada currently 
does not have any pre-prosecution diversion programs for felony offenders.30 
Instead, the only other option available to felony offenders is through the 
state’s specialty court system.31 These limited options, combined with Neva-
da’s high rate of incarceration versus community supervision, continue to drive 
the state’s growing prison population up.32 
In addition to the growing prison population, the number of inmates being 
admitted to prison with identified mental health needs has grown significant-
ly.33 Over the past decade, Nevada has seen a 35 percent increase in offenders 
entering prison with an identified mental health need.34 This problem is not 
unique to Nevada; it is estimated that anywhere from 37 percent to over half of 
all inmates have mental health problems, including drug dependence and 
abuse.35 Individuals with mental health needs present unique problems for the 
correctional system because they tend to “serve time in segregation, and to in-
cur disciplinary problems at higher rates than others with similar charges and 
criminal history.”36 As a result, offenders are often not getting the mental health 
services they need, and taxpayers are paying to continually incarcerate these 
individuals.37 
In order to accommodate the growing prison population, the NDOC’s 
budget has grown by 14 percent over the last ten years, coming in at $347 mil-
lion for 2019.38 Even with the increased budget, Nevada’s prisons are over-
crowded and operating beyond their intended capacities.39 This leaves fewer 
resources and reduced space for much-needed rehabilitation services.40 In re-
sponse to these growing pressures, the state had to contract with a private cor-
 
28  See id. at 12. 
29  See id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. Specialty courts are discussed in more detail infra Section II.C. 
32  See id. at 13. 
33  Id. at 15. 
34  Id. 
35  Beverly D. Frazier et al., The Impact of Prison Deinstitutionalization on Community 
Treatment Services, 3 HEALTH & JUST. 1, 2 (2015); Heather Stringer, Improving Mental 
Health for Inmates, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 46, 46 (2019). 
36  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 15. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 10. 
39  Id. at 9. 
40  Id. 
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rections corporation in Arizona to house overflow inmates.41 While the initial 
agreement was for $9.2 million over two years, the NDOC  forecasted an addi-
tional $5.3 million in third-party housing expenses for fiscal years 2020 and 
2021.42 Without immediate action, the ACAJ projects Nevada’s prison popula-
tion will grow by an additional 9 percent, “adding nearly 1,200 beds [with] an 
additional cost of [over] $770 million.”43 
Even with more money being spent and prisoners serving longer sentences, 
the ACAJ found that recidivism rates increased for most offenses over the last 
decade.44 Of the 4,996 released offenders in 2015, 1,375, or 27.52 percent of 
them, returned to the prison system within thirty-six months of their release.45 
While this is an improvement of 3.87 percent from the 2014 release cohort, it is 
still over 7 percent higher than the recidivism rate in 2010.46 Based on the 
NDOC’s data, property and drug offenders experienced the highest rates of re-
incarceration, coming in at 33.8 percent and 27.06 percent respectively.47 Not 
surprisingly, inmates who participated in job or vocational training were 2.7 
percent less likely to return to prison than those who did not participate in these 
programs.48 According to the NDOC’s data, offenders who completed the en-
tirety of their sentences were significantly less likely to return to the prison sys-
tem than those who were paroled.49 Offenders who discharged their sentences 
had a recidivism rate of 20.49 percent compared to 32.58 percent for offenders 
who were paroled.50 The NDOC attributes this discrepancy to the fact that more 
serious offenders need to be placed under community supervision.51 We believe 
the NDOC’s conclusion is a shallow view of the data, and there are other rea-
sonable alternatives that could explain this discrepancy. The NDOC correctly 
points out that paroled offenders must comply with the terms of their parole to 
be released into society.52 These limitations on an offender’s release are an al-
ternative explanation for why recidivism rates are higher amongst parolees. 
This alternative conclusion is supported by the ACAJ’s finding that 39 percent 
of new prison admissions in 2017 were due to community supervision viola-
 
41  Ben Botkin, Nevada Officials OK $9.2M Deal to Ship Inmates to Arizona, L.V. REV. J. 
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/nevada-officials-ok-9-2m-deal-to-
ship-inmates-to-arizona [https://perma.cc/DUB2-23QB]. 
42  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 10; NEV. DEP’T OF CORR., GOVERNOR RECOMMENDS 
BUDGET: STATE FISCAL YEAR 2020 & 2021 24 (2019). 
43  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 10. 
44  Id. at 4. Nevada calculates recidivism by looking to the percent of offenders released from 
custody who return to NDOC custody within thirty-six months. Id. at 13. 
45  NEV. DEP’T OF CORR., PRISON RECIDIVISM ANALYSIS: 2015 RELEASE COHORT 1 (2019). 
46  Id. 
47  See id. at 3. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
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tions.53 Additionally, 34 percent of these admissions were for technical viola-
tions of the offender’s community supervision.54 This means that these individ-
uals returning to prison did not necessarily commit a new crime or abscond; 
they simply were not able to comply with the terms of their release.55 
B. Overview of Assembly Bill 236 
“[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human 
mind. [A\s that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries 
are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions change with the 
change of circumstances, institutions must advance, and keep pace with the 
times.”56 
AB 236 of the 2019 Nevada Legislative Session was a broad omnibus bill 
that reformed several areas of the state’s criminal justice system.57 Three of the 
major successes of AB 236 were in the areas of: (1) redefining and reclassify-
ing certain crimes, (2) probation and parole reform, and (3) community reentry 
programs/procedures for inmates. 
1. Reclassification of Certain Crimes 
If the purpose of criminal laws is to further one of the three utilitarian in-
terests of deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation, the analysis for whether a 
criminal law is effective becomes relatively straightforward with the availabil-
ity of certain data. For example, if a state were to change its minimum prison 
sentence for theft from one to two years, the state could collect data to deter-
mine whether the increased minimum sentence has any substantive effect in re-
ducing theft (deterrence) or recidivism (rehabilitation), and balance those bene-
fits with the added costs that longer sentences have on society. This appears to 
be the type of analysis that Nevada legislators used when drafting AB 236, 
which made several revisions to the structure and/or definitions of different 
criminal statutes that were not ‘effective.’ The crimes that AB 236 revised, 
which are discussed in detail below, included: burglary, felony theft, “category 
B” crimes, and several drug-related offenses. 
 
53  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 31. 
54  Id. 
55  See id. 
56  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to “Henry Tompkinson” (Samuel Kercheval) (July 12, 
1816) (reprinted in Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-10-02-0128-0002 
[https://perma.cc/PS5H-NW88] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020)). 
57  See A.B. 236, 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019). 
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a. Burglary 
As of 2017, Burglary—or the act of unlawfully entering or remaining in a 
dwelling (or vehicle) with the intent to commit a crime (particularly theft)—
was the most common crime for which individuals were imprisoned in Neva-
da.58 Recognizing the variance of societal interests in preventing individuals 
from unlawfully entering, say, a motor vehicle as opposed to a personal resi-
dence, the sponsors of AB 236 reclassified burglary into different subtypes with 
corresponding penalties.59 For example, the burglary of a motor vehicle is now 
classified as a category E felony and carries a penalty of one to four years in 
prison, while the burglary of a personal residence is classified as a category B 
felony and carries a penalty of up to twenty years of imprisonment.60 
b. Felony Theft 
AB 236 also changed the language defining what constitutes “felony theft.” 
The utilitarian justification for having a multi-tiered classification/punishment 
system for theft-related crimes, instead of treating and punishing all theft equal-
ly, is relatively straightforward because theft inherently involves things of 
monetary value. It wouldn’t make sense to spend hundreds of thousands of tax-
payer dollars to convict and imprison an individual for shoplifting a pack of 
gum. On the other hand, it makes perfect sense (from a utilitarian perspective) 
to spend such resources to prevent/punish the theft of a multimillion-dollar 
item. AB 236 simply raises the minimum monetary threshold for when theft 
constitutes a mere misdemeanor, or a category D, C, or B felony.61 Specifically, 
the monetary threshold for a misdemeanor was raised from anything less than 
$650 to $1,200.62 Category D felonies, which were not included in the previous 
version of the statute, were added for thefts of items valued between $1,200 
and $5,000.63 Category C thresholds were raised for theft of items valued be-
tween $650 and $3,500 to $5,000 and $25,000; and finally, category B thresh-
olds were raised from anything over $3,500 to anything valued between 
$25,000 and $100,000.64 
 
58  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.060 (2019); ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE OF DATA FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 21 (2019) (on file 
with author). 
59  While “society” has the same general interest in preventing and deterring individuals from 
illegally entering any premises to commit a crime such as theft, there are additional interests 
when the burglary takes place in a person’s home as opposed to a commercial building (e.g., 
the invasion of privacy or the added likelihood that the residence’s owner will be home at the 
time of the burglary). 
60  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 193.130, 205.060 (2019). 
61  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 58 (Nev. 2019). 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
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c. “Category B” Crimes 
In 2017, individuals convicted of “Category B” crimes accounted for near-
ly half of all prison admissions in Nevada and spent an average of almost ten 
months longer in prison than the same category of individuals in 2011.65 While 
there are undoubtedly certain “Category B” crimes that require such a punish-
ment, the sponsors of AB 236 also recognized that certain crimes that were 
classified as “Category B” felonies did not seem to belong together. For exam-
ple, the non-violent crime of ‘knowingly selling a motor vehicle with an odom-
eter that had been fraudulently altered,’ was placed in the same category as 
‘battery resulting in substantial bodily harm.’66 While Nevadans undeniably 
have an interest in preventing and deterring both activities, attempting to elimi-
nate (or at least reduce) violent crimes stands out as a more pressing societal 
interest. Therefore, AB 236 reclassified certain non-violent crimes that were 
considered “Category B” felonies and made them “Category C” felonies.67 
d. Drug-Related Crimes 
One of the bill’s major changes included certain modifications to the Ne-
vada Revised Statutes’ (NRS) provisions for drug-related crimes and their as-
sociated penalties. There are several utilitarian justifications to support changes 
to drug-related crimes. First and foremost is the cornerstone utilitarian tenet 
that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilised [sic] community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.”68 While it is plain that certain drug-related laws are in place to “prevent 
harm to others,”69 many drug-related crimes punish what some argue is “vic-
timless” conduct.70  
Furthermore, societal trends generally show that the public is adopting a 
more accepting attitude toward drug use.71 Therefore, if the goal of a utilitarian 
criminal justice system is to institute and enforce laws that cause more societal 
‘good’ than ‘harm,’ it makes sense to restructure crimes that prohibit conduct 
 
65  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 28. 
66  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.481, 484D.335 (2019). 
67  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. §§ 84, 111, 125, 130 (Nev. 2019) (reclassifying non-violent crimes 
including: knowingly selling a motor vehicle with an odometer that had been fraudulently 
altered, the unlawful use of a scanner, certain gaming crimes, and maintaining a drug house). 
68  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Batoche Books Ltd. 2001) (1859). 
69  For example, NEV. REV. STAT § 484C.110 (2019) contains provisions that prohibit indi-
viduals from driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs. Justification for this 
prohibition is not necessarily a moral condemnation of drug use itself (although it is possible 
that was certain legislator’s motivation in passing the law), rather, it is the recognition of the 
increased potential harm that a driver under the influence of drugs poses to others. 
70  B. Grant Stitt, Victimless Crime: A Definitional Issue, 11 J. CRIME & JUST. 87, 88–89 
(1988). 
71  Andrew Daniller, Two-Thirds of Americans Support Marijuana Legalization, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Nov. 14, 2019) https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/14/americans-support-
marijuana-legalization [https://perma.cc/J3Z7-FNRW]. 
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that past generations believed caused societal harm, but which ‘harm’ modern 
society increasingly calls into question. Finally, there is also evidence that the 
current structure and prosecution of many drug-related crimes fail in their utili-
tarian aims—as they are not effective, efficient, or equitable.72 For all of these 
reasons, Nevada’s drug-related crimes deserved (and continue to deserve) a 
hard look to ensure they are justified. 
First, AB 236 changed certain definitions and prescribed punishments for 
simple drug-possession-related offenses. Shockingly, the number of individuals 
who were incarcerated for simple drug possession grew by over 53 percent 
from 2008 to 2017.73 AB 236 revised the penalties for possession of a con-
trolled substance based on the schedule in which the controlled substance is 
listed and the quantity the individual possessed.74 For example, AB 236 
changed existing law so that individuals who are arrested for the first or second 
time for possessing less than fourteen grams of a schedule I drug are guilty of a 
category E felony.75 By taking the amount of a drug that an offender possesses 
into account, the associated penalties become more proportionate to the ‘harm’ 
caused by the conduct. 
Additionally, AB 236 made certain revisions to Nevada law regarding 
drug-trafficking statutes. Similar to the provisions discussed above, AB 236 re-
vised the amount (weight) of a controlled substance that an individual must 
possess to qualify as “drug-trafficking.”76 Before AB 236 was passed, evidence 
that an individual possessed over four grams of any schedule I controlled sub-
stance could be used to presumptively establish that the individual was guilty of 
drug-trafficking, regardless of the type of drug.77 AB 236 initially contained 
provisions that would have abolished this presumption by requiring prosecutors 
to present additional evidence of an intent to sell.78 After several amendments, 
AB 236 in its final form adjusted the amounts of controlled substances that an 
individual would have to possess to be guilty of “low-level,” or “high-level” 
drug trafficking.79 Specifically, “low-level” trafficking is possession of 100 to 
400 grams of a controlled substance, whereas “high-level” trafficking is pos-
session of anything more than 400 grams.80 While there is more that can be 
 
72  Matthew S. Crow & Kathrine A. Johnson, Race, Ethnicity, and Habitual-Offender Sen-
tencing, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 63, 80 (2008). Evidence tends to show that, for a number 
of reasons, African American individuals are disproportionately prosecuted and convicted of 
drug-related crimes to a greater degree than white individuals arrested for the same crimes. 
Id. at 64, 72. 
73  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 25. 
74  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 113 (Nev. 2019). 
75  Id. 
76  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 119 (Nev. 2019). 
77  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.3385 (2019) (prior to 2019 amendment). 
78  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 118 (Nev. 2019) (as introduced). 
79  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 119 (Nev. 2019). 
80  Id. 
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done to improve upon the drug-related crimes in Nevada, AB 236 made several 
important steps in the right direction. 
2. Probation Reform 
One of the major factors responsible for Nevada’s ever-increasing prison 
population is that on average, prisoners are serving longer sentences than they 
were ten years ago.81 AB 236 made several changes to Nevada law to reduce 
the number of individuals in prison, without compromising public safety. Spe-
cifically, AB 236 adjusted parole law and procedure in order to (1) establish 
clear criteria for when prisoners qualify for probation—including presumptive 
probation, and (2) modify the punishments for certain parole violations so that 
parolees are not unnecessarily sent back to prison for “technical violations.”82 
If imprisonment is only justified if it effectively deters certain conduct, 
prevents individuals from causing further harm, and/or rehabilitates individuals 
so that they will not cause harm in the future, then criteria determining when 
offenders qualify for parole, or, “[t]he conditional release of a prisoner from 
imprisonment before the full sentence has been served,” would also be aligned 
with achieving these goals.83 Prior to the passage of AB 236, Nevada law pro-
vided presumptive probation sentencing for certain category E felonies, but 
there were many exceptions such as if the offender: (1) was on parole at the 
time he was arrested, (2) had previously had parole revoked, or (3) had previ-
ously failed a treatment program.84 However, none of these exceptions—in and 
of themselves—evinced that the offender posed a threat to public safety.85 
Therefore, AB 236 removed these barriers to a presumptive parole sentence.86 
Additionally, AB 236 also sought to address the problem of the increasing 
number of probationers in Nevada who were being sent back to prison. Data 
indicated that 34 percent of probationers who were sent back to prison were 
sent back for “technical violations,” which are defined as “a violation of super-
vision conditions not rising to the level of new criminal conduct nor abscond-
ing.”87 In other words, probationers were being sent back to prison for things 
such as, “missing a meeting with a supervision officer.”88 AB 236 specified that 
courts could send probation violators back to prison for offenses including vio-
lent or sexual crimes, while outlining the procedure for when probationers 
committed technical violations.89 
 
81  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 13. 
82  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 35 (Nev. 2019). 
83  Parole, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARy (11th ed. 2019). 
84  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 24 (Nev. 2019). 
85  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 13. 
86  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 24 (Nev. 2019). 
87  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 13. 
88  Id. 
89  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. §§ 35, 101 (Nev. 2019). 
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However, simply increasing the number of parolees presents its own set of 
problems. Data indicates that in the past decade, the number of parolees has in-
creased by 84 percent, while the number of probation officers has decreased by 
7 percent.90 Simply put, the resources available to deal with the increasing 
number of parolees are becoming increasingly strained. AB 236 sought to recti-
fy this problem in two ways. First, AB 236 reduces parole length by prescribing 
certain conditions where the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners would be 
required to review parole eligibility of offenders and make a recommendation 
for release with or without a hearing.91 Second, AB 236 requires the Division 
of Parole and Probation of the Department of Public Safety (the Division) to 
make individualized assessments of each inmate who is eligible for parole in 
order to efficiently and effectively allocate Nevada’s limited resources to parol-
ees who are considered to be a high risk.92 
3. Community Reentry Programs and Procedures 
The final area that AB 236 affected concerns the available programs and 
procedures in Nevada to support prisoners’ successful reintegration into society 
once they have served their sentences. Three of the strongest predictors of re-
cidivism are the availability of (1) employment, (2) housing, and (3) treatment 
programs for addictions—such as substance abuse addictions.93 While Nevada 
had certain reentry requirements and procedures prior to the passage of AB 
236, those procedures and requirements only focused on housing, and ignored 
the other barriers of employment and treatment.94 
AB 236 sought to remedy this by requiring the Department of Corrections 
to develop a reentry plan for each parole-eligible prisoner six months before the 
prisoner’s parole date.95 The reentry plan is required to take the prisoner’s 
needs, limitations, and capabilities into consideration.96 Additionally, AB 236 
requires the Director to provide offenders being released with a photo identifi-
cation card (if they do not already possess one), clothing, certain transportation 
costs, and a thirty-day supply of prescribed medication if the offender was re-
ceiving such medication while in prison.97 Finally, the passage of AB 236 re-
quires the Director to release the offender to a facility for transitional living (if 
appropriate), and to complete enrollment application paperwork for Medicaid 
and Medicare for eligible offenders.98 
 
90  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 17. 
91  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 97–99 (Nev. 2019). 
92  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 95 (Nev. 2019). 
93  Matthew Makarios et al., Examining the Predictors of Recidivism Among Men and Wom-
en Released from Prison in Ohio, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1377, 1384–85 (2010). 
94  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 33. 
95  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 100 (Nev. 2019). 
96  Id. 
97  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 92 (Nev. 2019). 
98  Id. 
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II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. Pre-Sentence Diversion Programs 
Nevada currently allows certain offenders who are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of a municipal or justice court to participate in a pre-sentence diversion 
program.99 By participating in these court-established programs, qualifying of-
fenders have the opportunity to avoid prosecution by participating instead in a 
rehabilitation program that is hand-tailored by the presiding judge, the prosecu-
tor, and the offender in order to uniquely address and rectify the offense.100 
However, due to the limited jurisdiction of municipal and justice courts in Ne-
vada, the types of offenses that are eligible for pre-sentence diversion programs 
are limited to minor offenses such as misdemeanors and city nuisance viola-
tions.101  
AB 236 in its original form included provisions that would have authorized 
district courts to establish pre-sentence diversion programs, which would have 
naturally expanded the types of offenses subject to Nevada’s pre-sentencing di-
version programs.102 These provisions were included in response to evidence 
indicating that four in ten individuals who enter prison in Nevada have no prior 
felonies, and about two-thirds of inmates are incarcerated for non-violent of-
fenses.103 By allowing certain non-violent, first-time offenders to participate in 
pre-sentence diversion programs, courts would be able to reduce the strain on 
Nevada’s already-overcrowded prisons, without compromising public safety. 
However, the proposal to expand the state’s existing diversion programs to 
district courts was met with heavy resistance from several of the District Attor-
ney’s offices in Nevada. Several reasons were given to support why they be-
lieved extending the authority to create and administer pre-sentence diversion 
programs to district courts was problematic.104 As a result of this opposition, 
the sections that would have granted that authority to Nevada district courts 
 
99  NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.031 (2019). 
100  Id. § 174.032. 
101  Id. § 5.050 limits the jurisdiction of municipal courts in Nevada to civil and misdemeanor 
cases, nuisance abatement cases, and cases involving $2,500 or less where the plaintiff is the 
city. Furthermore, NEV. REV. STAT. § 4.370 limits justice courts’ jurisdiction to civil matters 
not exceeding $15,000 in damages, evictions, misdemeanors, small claims, traffic cases, and 
other matters. 
102  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. §§ 1–4 (Nev. 2019) (as introduced). 
103  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 21. 
104  See Letter from Stephen B. Rye, Dist. Attorney, Office of the Dist. Attorney Lyon Cty., 
to Steve Yeager, Chairman, Nev. Assembly Judiciary (Mar. 7, 2019), (available at 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/ExhibitDocument/OpenExhibitDocu
ment?exhibitId=37611&fileDownloadName=0308AB236_ryes_ltrinopposition.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9NUS-22HL]); Clark Cty. Office of the Dist. Attorney, Proposed Amend-
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were removed from the final version of AB 236.105 We will address each con-
cern in turn to show why Nevada’s future legislative bodies should grant dis-
trict courts the authority to create and administer pre-sentence diversion pro-
grams. 
First, several District Attorney’s offices expressed concern that significant 
difficulties would arise in the event that offenders failed to complete their di-
version programs, which would force District Attorneys to prosecute them.106 
This created concern that the lapse in time between when the offense occurred 
and when the offender failed to complete the diversion program would be an 
added obstacle in building a case against the offender.107 But the District Attor-
neys provided no data showing that their cases would grow weaker with the 
passage of time. In fact, prosecutors are currently required to perform an initial 
investigation to help determine whether an offender even qualifies to partici-
pate in currently existing pre-sentence diversion programs.108 Therefore, merely 
expanding the pool of potential participants for diversion programs should have 
no effect on the ‘strength’ of prosecutors’ cases—as they would still be re-
quired to perform initial investigations. Furthermore, expansion of diversion 
programs would actually benefit prosecutors, because by removing less serious 
and non-violent offenses from prosecution, District Attorneys would be able to 
focus their efforts and resources exclusively on offenders who actually pose a 
serious risk to public safety. 
Second, some worried that pre-sentence diversion programs would violate 
certain victims’ rights created by the passage of the recent amendment to the 
Nevada Constitution known as “Marsy’s Law.”109 Specifically, the “Rights of 
victims of crime,” as defined in the Nevada Constitution, guarantees victims, 
among other things, the right: 
To reasonable notice of all public proceedings, including delinquency proceed-
ings, upon request, at which the defendant and the prosecutor are entitled to be 
present and of all parole or other postconviction release proceedings, and to be 
present at all such proceedings . . . [t]o be reasonably heard, upon request, at any 
public proceeding, including any delinquency proceeding, in any court involving 
release or sentencing, and at any parole proceeding . . . [and] [t]o provide infor-
mation to any public officer or employee conducting a presentence investigation 
concerning the impact of the offense on the victim and the victim’s family and 
any sentencing recommendations before the sentencing of the defendant.110 
 
105  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. §§ 1–4 (Nev. 2019) (as introduced). 
106  Letter from Stephen B. Rye, supra note 101. 
107  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. §§ 1–4 (Nev. 2019) (as introduced). 
108  NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.032(2) (2019) “[T]he justice or municipal court must receive in-
put from the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, if any, and the defendant 
relating to the terms and conditions for the defendant’s participation in the program.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
109  Letter from Stephen B. Rye, supra note 101. 
110  NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8A(g)–(h), (j) (West, Westlaw through 2019 amendments). 
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Nevertheless, Marsy’s law has been criticized for undermining the pre-
sumption of innocence by allowing victims to be involved in processes prior to 
conviction, and for infringing on the constitutional rights afforded to accused 
parties, namely the right to effective assistance of counsel.111 In fact, Marsy’s 
law has been challenged in at least four other states where it has been enact-
ed.112 If anything, no state law can trump the constitutional rights afforded to 
defendants.113 
Third, there was concern that given the current budgetary constraints and 
limited personnel resources of Nevada’s district courts, they would not be able 
to handle or afford the additional influx of cases that AB 236’s diversion pro-
gram would create.114 While court resources are an important and valid consid-
eration, the idea that diversion programs will ‘create’ an influx of new cases is 
flawed. Whether the courts are required to process a case through the tradition-
al route of prosecution, or through the alternative method of diversion pro-
grams, the number of cases does not change. Furthermore, the language of the 
statute does not require any municipal or justice court to establish a diversion 
program; it only gives them the authority to do so.115 Therefore, extending this 
authority to district courts would not force them to establish any program for 
which there was not enough funding or resources. 
Finally, some argued that because Nevada’s counties consist of both urban 
and rural communities, whose resources and needs are significantly different 
from one another, requiring district courts to establish and administer diversion 
programs according to one set of uniform standards would be impossible, par-
ticularly for the rural counties.116 Again, the statute’s language grants courts 
broad discretion in whether and how they administer pre-sentence diversion 
programs. This discretionary language allows individual courts (who arguably 
are best suited to address their jurisdiction’s specific needs) to administer di-
version programs in a manner appropriate for their jurisdictions. 
B. Drug Issues 
Drug crimes continue to be a driving force behind Nevada’s growing pris-
on population.117 One reason for this is that drug offenders make up a dispro-
 
111  Marsy’s Law Is Bad for Nevada, ACLU NEV., https://www.aclunv.org/en/issues/marsys-
law [https://perma.cc/F4BX-SA73] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
112  Id. 
113  U.S. CONSt. art. VI, cl. 2. 
114  Ryan Black, City of Las Vegas, AB 236 Official Position: Opposed (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/ExhibitDocument/OpenExhibitDocu
ment?exhibitId=43177&fileDownloadName=0308SB236_blar_ltrinopp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6FDQ-AWPZ]; Letter from Stephen B. Rye, supra note 101. 
115  NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.032(1) (2019) (“A justice court or municipal court may establish 
a preprosecution diversion program to which it may assign a defendant if he or she is deter-
mined to be eligible pursuant to NRS 174.031.”) (emphases added). 
116  Letter from Stephen B. Rye, supra note 101. 
117  See supra Section I.B. 
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portionally large portion of community supervision failures.118 Of all offenders 
admitted to prison for probation violations in 2017, 8 percent were on probation 
for simple possession offenses.119 In Nevada, simple possession of a controlled 
substance is still a Category E felony carrying a sentence of one to four 
years.120 Before the passage of AB 236, Nevada law provided for presumptive 
probation for an individual convicted of a Category E felony unless the offend-
er: (1) was on parole or probation at the time the crime was committed, (2) had 
previously had parole or probation revoked, (3) had previously failed to com-
plete a court ordered treatment program, or (4) had been convicted of at least 
two additional felonies.121 Therefore, if the offender met any of those four crite-
ria the court was not required to grant the offender probation. The ACAJ found 
that these barriers to presumptive probation were not serving Nevada’s correc-
tional goals and were simply putting non-violent drug addicts behind bars.122 
As a result, the ACAJ recommended that the Nevada legislature abolish all four 
barriers to presumptive probation for Category E felonies.123 Ultimately, the 
legislature abolished the first three barriers to presumptive probation for Cate-
gory E felonies but kept the requirement that an offender not have been con-
victed of two or more felonies.124 While removing barriers to presumptive pro-
bation is a positive step in the right direction to ensure that prison resources are 
being used to best serve the public interest, there is still much more that can be 
done. 
Even though first-and second-time drug offenders are not going to prison 
in Nevada, they still must live with the felony conviction. In addition to the risk 
of incarceration, felony offenders face a number of collateral consequences as a 
result of their conviction status.125 Convicted felons face a number of extrajudi-
cial punishments including social stigma, limitations on employment, barriers 
to affordable housing, and disenfranchisement.126 It is estimated that up to one 
in four Americans are locked out of the labor market due to a criminal convic-
tion.127 Some studies estimate that this loss of production costs the United 
 
118  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 25. 
119  Id. 
120  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 193.130, 453.336 (2019). 
121  Id. § 176A.100. 
122  See FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 25. 
123  Id. 
124  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 24(b) (Nev. 2019). 
125  Brian Elderbroom & Julia Durnan, Reclassified: State Drug Law Reforms to Reduce Fel-
ony Convictions and Increase Second Chances, URBAN INST. 1, 2 (2018). 
126  U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RRIGHTS, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF 
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 35 (2019) [hereinafter 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES]; Elderbroom & Durnan, supra note, 122 at 2–3. In Nevada, 
felons have their rights to vote restored upon completion of their sentences or release from 
prison. NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.157(1)(b) (2019). However, several states still restrict felons’ 
voting rights even after completion of their sentences. Elderbroom & Durnan supra note 
122, at 3. 
127  COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 123, at 35. 
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States GDP between $50 billion and $87 billion every year.128 Regardless of 
the exact figure, it is clear that felony convictions have a significant impact on 
individuals trying to enter the job market. 
In order to reduce the collateral consequences on drug offenders, a number 
of states have moved towards defelonizing simple possession of a controlled 
substance.129 In these states, simple possession was reclassified from a felony 
to a misdemeanor .130 The goal behind reclassification is to reduce prison popu-
lations for low-level offenders and focus correctional resources on society’s 
most dangerous offenders.131 The reclassification movement is supported by the 
growing body of evidence that incarceration is not the most effective response 
to combating drug abuse.132 Instead, research shows that drug abusers are better 
treated in the community, and treatment approaches produce better public safe-
ty results.133 
Several states that have moved towards defelonization are already realizing 
positive effects.134 California, Utah, and Connecticut have defelonized simple 
possession and have already experienced decreases in the number of people in 
prison for drug possession.135 In 2014, nearly 60 percent of California voters 
approved Proposition 47, which generally reclassified drug possession from a 
felony to a misdemeanor and generally prohibited prison sentences for posses-
sion convictions.136 Additionally, the California law applied retroactively, al-
lowing offenders serving jail time for low-level drug offenses to petition for 
their release.137 In the first year Proposition 47 went into effect, bookings for 
drug possession offenses decreased 68 percent.138 This translated into an esti-
mated savings of over $150 million for the state and another $200 million for 
local governments in the first year Proposition 47 was enacted.139 California’s 
reclassification of simple possession also had a positive effect on rearrests and 
reconvictions of low-level drug offenders.140 In the two years after implementa-
 
128  Id.; Elderbroom & Durnan, supra note 122, at 2. 
129  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 25; Elderbroom & Durnan, supra note 122, at 4. 
130  Elderbroom & Durnan, supra note 122, at 4. 
131  See id. at 6. 
132  Id. at 7. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 6. 
135  Id. 
136  MIA BIRD ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. CAL., THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 47 ON CRIME AND 
RECIDIVISM 4 (2018), https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0618mbr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T5DL-APUC] (Proposition 47 also reclassified a number of additional 
crimes including: check forgery, receiving stolen property, shoplifting, theft under $950, and 
writing bad checks). 
137  Id. 
138  Elderbroom & Durnan, supra note 122, at 14. 
139  Id.; Stanford Justice Advocacy Project, Proposition 47 Progress Report: Year One Im-
plementation, STANFORD L. SCH. 1 (2015). 
140  BIRD ET AL., supra note 133, at 17. 
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tion of Proposition 47, rearrests for drug offenses fell by 11 percent, and recon-
victions fell by nearly 8 percent.141 
Experts in other states like Oklahoma, Connecticut, Utah, and Alaska have 
predicted equally successful reductions as a result of reclassification.142 Similar 
to California, in 2016, nearly 60 percent of Oklahoma voters approved State 
Question 780 (S.Q. 780),which reclassified simple possession to a misdemean-
or.143 The state predicted approximately $137 million in averted costs in the 
five years following implementation, with a significant portion of those savings 
coming from a decrease in incarceration.144 The money saved by S.Q. 780 is to 
be deposited into a Community Safety Investment Fund that can help fund 
mental health and substance abuse programs in the state.145 
Building off of these early successes, the ACAJ recommended Nevada re-
classify simple possession of a controlled substance from a Category E felony 
to a misdemeanor for the first two offenses.146 The ACAJ recommended reserv-
ing the felony conviction for an individual’s third and subsequent possession 
convictions.147 The ACAJ’s recommendation would fall in line with other 
states that have sought to reduce prison populations through reclassification of 
drug offenses.148 According to the ACAJ, reclassifying simple possession 
would reduce prison populations, allowing corrections dollars to be better spent 
on violent offenders, allow for better supervision and treatment of drug offend-
ers, and remove the “adverse collateral consequences of a felony convic-
tion.”149 
Unfortunately, AB 236 remains mostly silent on the issue of drug classifi-
cation. The first draft of AB 236 attempted to adopt the ACAJ recommenda-
tions, but reclassification never made it into the final version of the bill.150 
While drug classification as a whole did not make it into the final version of the 
bill, the legislature did address the state’s antiquated trafficking limits.151 Prior 
to the passage of AB 236, an individual in possession of as little as four grams 
of a controlled substance could be charged with low-level trafficking regardless 
 
141  Id. at 17–18. 
142  Elderbroom & Durnan, supra note 122, at 6. 
143  Id. at 16. 
144  OFFICE OF MGMT. & ENTER. SERVS., OKLAHOMA SMART JUSTICE REFORM ACT (SQ 781) 
FY 2018 CALCULATIONS: FINAL REPORT (2006), 
https://omes.ok.gov/sites/g/files/gmc316/f/SQ781_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJQ5-HW9K]. In 
conjunction with S.Q. 780, Oklahoma voters passed S.Q. 781, which directed the Oklahoma 
Office of Management and Enterprise Services to assess the fiscal impact of S.Q. 780. Id. 
145  Elderbroom & Durnan, supra note 122, at 16. 
146  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 25. 
147  Id. 
148  See Elderbroom & Durnan, supra note 122, at 1. 
149  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 25. 
150  A.B. 236, 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (as enrolled); A.B. 236, 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (as in-
troduced). 
151  See A.B. 236, 80th Sess. § 119 (Nev. 2019). 
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of intent to sell.152 AB 236 amended low-level trafficking to possession of 100–
400 grams of a schedule I or II controlled substance and raised high-level traf-
ficking to possession of over 400 grams.153 
While AB 236 takes a number of progressive steps towards reducing recid-
ivism, failing to include reclassification was one of its biggest shortcomings. 
Reclassification is a commonsense approach to reduce the state’s corrections 
budget and to avoid needlessly imposing the collateral consequences of a felo-
ny conviction on drug addicts. As a state, we do not see drug users as a grave 
threat to the public safety. Nevada law provides for mandatory probation for 
individuals convicted of a Category E felony.154 Even with the mandatory pro-
bation provision, prison admissions for simple possession have risen signifi-
cantly over the past decade.155 This brings us back to the theories of justice and 
why we punish. If the goal is to promote public safety, then it makes no sense 
to convict first- and second-time drug offenders of felonies. Reclassifying sim-
ple possession offenses from a felony to a misdemeanor allows the state to fo-
cus its prosecutorial and correctional resources on more violent and high-need 
offenders. Additionally, addicts and individuals who have made mistakes in 
their lives would have the opportunity to get their lives back on track before 
they are labeled felons for the rest of their lives. 
C. Specialty Courts 
Specialty courts are unique courtroom settings because they focus on the 
treatment and rehabilitation of the offenders involved.156 These courts can be 
one of the strongest tools a state has to drive down recidivism rates because in-
stead of only punishing past behavior they “seek to change future behavior by 
addressing factors that contribute to offenders’ involvement in the criminal jus-
tice system.”157 Data compiled by the National Drug Court Institute shows that 
adult drug courts typically reduce rearrest rates by 8 to 14 percent over a period 
of two years, with the best programs reducing recidivism by 35 to 80 per-
cent.158 Additionally, this research demonstrated that completion of a drug 
court program had long-lasting effects on its participants.159 Several studies 
found that the effects of the drug court program stuck with participants for over 
three years after completion of the program, and one study found the effects of 
 
152  See id. 
153  Id. 
154  NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.100(b) (2019) (as amended by A.B. 236 § 24). 
155  FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 25. 
156  Emily F. Wood et al., Specialty Courts: Time for a Thorough Assessment, 36 MISS. C. L. 
REV. 332, 333 (2018). 
157  Id. 
158  DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE ET AL., NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT 
PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 15 (2016). 
159  Id. 
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the program on recidivism lasted fourteen years.160 In addition to successfully 
driving down recidivism rates, adult drug courts are cost effective for the juris-
dictions using them.161 From the data analyzed by the NDCI, adult drug courts 
offered an average return on investment of two to four dollars for every one 
dollar invested, which saved local communities an average of $3,000 to 
$22,000 per participant.162 This type of return is promising in light of extremely 
poor return on taxpayer money for incarcerating drug users.163 
Fortunately for local municipalities, they are not left guessing how to best 
implement their specialty court programs. The National Association of Drug 
Court Professionals (NADCP) released two volumes of best-practice standards 
based on years of research and analysis of drug court practices throughout the 
country.164 These standards include practices for determining eligibility, re-
sponsibilities of the court, sanctions and incentives, treatment practices, testing, 
and monitoring.165 
In Nevada there are currently eighty-five specialty court programs166 in-
cluding adult drug court, family drug court, mental health court, and DUI 
court.167 In 2019 alone, Nevada specialty courts served nearly 6,800 partici-
pants, nearly twice as many as in 2010.168 While the state’s specialty court pro-
gram has seen impressive growth over the past decade, the ACAJ still identi-
fied a number of shortcomings with Nevada’s program.169 Nevada traditionally 
assigns offenders to specialty courts as either a condition of a deferred sentence 
or as a condition of probation post-conviction.170 Under the deferred sentence 
approach, offenders will have their cases dismissed upon successful completion 
of the program.171 Conversely, when a program is instituted as a condition of an 
offender’s probation after a conviction, the offender still has to live with the 
negative collateral consequences of the conviction even if the offender success-
fully completes the program.172 This difference appears to have a meaningful 
 
160  Id. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  See Letter from Adam Gelb to Chris Christie (June 19, 2017) at 10. 
164  MARLOWE ET AL., supra note 155, at 17. 
165  See generally 1 NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, ADULT DRUG COURT BEST 
PRACTICE STANDARDS (2013); 2 NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, ADULT DRUG COURT 
BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS (2015). 
166  SUPREME COURT OF NEV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEVADA JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 
2019 51 (2019) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2019]. 
167  Specialty Court Program Overview, SUPREME COURT OF NEV., 
https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Programs_and_Services/Specialty_Courts/Overview 
[https://perma.cc/M86C-74LN] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). 
168  ANNUAL REPORT 2019, supra note 163, at 51; SUPREME COURT OF NEV., ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE NEVADA JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2010 48 (2010). 
169  See FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 21–22. 
170  Id. at 12. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. at 22. 
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effect on an offender’s success rate in the program. According to the ACAJ’s 
research, in 2017 “67 percent of participants with a deferred sentence were suc-
cessful in their Specialty Court program, compared to just 42 percent of partic-
ipants who were successful without a deferral.”173 Despite this dramatic differ-
ence in success rates, Nevada courts still impose specialty court programs as a 
condition of probation post-conviction at a much higher rate than deferred sen-
tences.174 
The success rate disparity between deferred sentence programs and post-
conviction programs does not necessarily mean post-conviction programs do 
not have an essential role to play in rehabilitating offenders.175 Depending on 
the individual’s specific offense and risk assessment, a post-conviction program 
may be appropriate.176 Post-conviction drug courts have been shown to be more 
effective for high-risk and high-need offenders.177 This kind of situation could 
arise under the reclassification proposal discussed earlier for an offender facing 
his or her third or subsequent possession offense. Individuals facing multiple 
possession offenses might need the structure and associated consequences of a 
post-conviction program, but those individuals still clearly need help and 
treatment for their addictions. 
While the overall growth and success of Nevada’s specialty court programs 
is encouraging, there are still areas of the program that can be improved to en-
sure the state is maximizing the dollars spent on the program. In its final report, 
the ACAJ identified two main areas of improvement: deferred sentences and 
eligibility criteria.178 The ACAJ’s analysis showed that offenders with a de-
ferred sentence were significantly more likely to successfully complete their 
specialty court programs than post-conviction offenders, but Nevada still tends 
to favor post-conviction programs.179 As a result, the ACAJ recommended that 
non-violent offenders entering a specialty court program be entitled to the re-
buttable presumption of a deferred sentence.180 
Ultimately, the Nevada legislature did not adopt the ACAJ’s presumption 
recommendation. AB 236 does provide a mechanism for judges to defer sen-
tences for individuals placed in specialty court programs.181 Specifically, AB 
236 allows a court to “defer judgement for any defendant who is placed in a 
specialty court program” and “[u]pon completion of the terms and conditions of 
the deferred judgment, and upon a finding by the court that the terms and con-
ditions have been met, the court shall discharge the defendant and dismiss the 
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proceedings.”182 It is encouraging that this option is built into the mechanics of 
AB 236, but the ultimate success of the programs relies on judges exercising 
their discretion to use this option, and it requires sufficient available programs 
to handle these offenders. 
Additionally, the ACAJ identified that the Drug Court and Mental Health 
Court programs do not have standard eligibility criteria for admission into the 
programs.183 As a result, Nevada experiences “significant regional variation in 
which offenders participate in the programs.”184 Currently, most jurisdictions in 
Nevada use a referral system from the court handling the case to place offend-
ers into specialty court programs.185 Conversely, the DUI Court program has 
standardized admission criteria that are set in statute and has a higher success 
rate than the other specialty court programs.186 Similar to the DUI court criteria, 
the NADCP recommends that drug court admissions be established on an ob-
jective basis.187 The NADCP found evidence-based selection criteria to be sig-
nificantly more reliable than subjective criteria in matching offenders with ap-
propriate treatment programs.188 As a result, programs using standardized tools 
typically enjoy higher success rates than those that do not.189 Specifically, pro-
grams are most successful when “the intensity of the criminal justice supervi-
sion is matched to participants’ risk for recidivism” and “treatment focuses on 
the specific disorders and conditions that are responsible for the participants’ 
crimes.”190 
Standardized eligibility criteria serve another important goal of ensuring 
specialty court programs are being used for the high-risk and high-need offend-
ers.191 High-risk and high-need offenders are typically addicted to drugs or al-
cohol, and are at a higher risk of recidivism or failing in a less intensive pro-
gram.192 Studies have shown that drug courts are “approximately twice as 
effective at reducing crime and 50 [percent] more cost-effective when they 
serve high-risk, high-need participants . . . .”193 Conversely, low-risk offenders 
may actually see negative results from rigorous specialty court programs.194 By 
placing too many limitations on a low-risk offender, the system may be simply 
setting them up for failure. Additionally, research shows that mixing low- and 
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high-risk offenders yields negative results because the low-risk offenders are 
exposed to anti-social behavior present in high-risk participants.195 
Based on these findings, Nevada should adopt standardized eligibility crite-
ria for all specialty court admissions. Potential participants should undergo an 
in-person assessment, similar to DUI Court, to assess the offender’s individual 
risk and need characteristics. Using this process can ensure that only those of-
fenders who will benefit from the specialty court program are being admitted. 
This system conforms with the NADCP’s standards for best practices and fo-
cuses resources on the participants who would benefit most from the programs. 
Funding continues to be a major roadblock to maximizing the effectiveness of 
the specialty court system in Nevada.196 For example, the Las Vegas mental 
health court can only handle a handful of cases at a time, and cases can take a 
few years to complete.197 As a result, the Las Vegas mental health court has had 
only sixty-three participants from 2015 to 2019.198 However, based on the 
NDCI’s return on investment numbers, specialty courts are a compelling candi-
date for increased state funding.199 
D. Sources of Funding 
“A penny saved is two pence clear.”200 
Asking the question of how state programs are funded is an essential step 
in the legislative process. Indeed, one could argue that it is better to not pass a 
law at all than to pass a law without ensuring the enacting and enforcing bodies 
have the tools they need to succeed. The sponsors of AB 236 relied on collect-
ed data to carefully shape legislation that was not only sound policy-wise, but 
that was also fiscally possible and responsible. In fact, if all the provisions in-
cluded in the initial draft of AB 236 had been enacted, the state would have 
saved an estimated $640 million by averting nearly 90 percent of the state’s 
projected prison population growth.201 Furthermore, AB 236 ensures that future 
legislators are able to continue to effectively reform Nevada’s criminal justice 
system by ensuring that they have accurate and current data by requiring the 
Sentencing Commission to collect and analyze data relating to prison admis-
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sions, releases, and parole practices, and to present that data in an annual report 
to the legislature.202 
However, whenever any new resources are made available, there is a great 
temptation to earmark those resources for state programs such as public educa-
tion or healthcare. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to simply reapportion 
future savings facilitated by AB 236’s changes. First, it would be bad policy to 
divert funding from a department just because it implements practices and poli-
cies that result in net savings. Not only would this preclude the department 
from ‘reinvesting’ saved funds into expanding policies and laws that have al-
ready proven to be cost saving, it would also create a perverse incentive for 
state actors to be fiscally inefficient—to ensure that their funding would not be 
reallocated to other departments by future legislation. 
Second, while $640 million is a large sum of money, it is a proverbial 
‘drop in the bucket’ when compared to the funding that education and 
healthcare already receive. Nevada’s current overall budget accounts for 
$29,407,082,276.203 Forty-four percent of that amount is already allocated to 
human resource programs such as Medicare, and 24.59 percent is designated 
for education.204 The Department of Corrections (DOC) accounts for only 2.54 
percent of the state’s budget.205 Therefore, diverting any savings from criminal 
justice reform into education and healthcare would only have a negligible im-
pact in those areas. It is therefore proposed that future Nevada legislatures use 
any funds that are saved through the implementation of AB 236 (as will be re-
ported annually by the Sentencing Commission) to fund additional cost-saving 
criminal policies, procedures and programs such as the pre-sentencing diver-
sion program, specialty court programs, and treatment programs discussed 
above. 
CONCLUSION 
AB 236 is a monumental step forward for criminal justice reform in Neva-
da. The bill allocates limited resources to dealing with the most dangerous 
criminals in our society and eases some of the unnecessary burdens placed on 
low-level and first-time offenders. Still, there is work to be done to ensure jus-
tice is being served in a way that protects the public and is financially sound. 
This paper asks the people of Nevada to take a step back and ask, what is the 
point of punishment? In light of those principals, we believe there is more that 
can be done to break the cycle of recidivism and accomplish those goals. No 
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longer should a first-time offender, convicted of simple possession of a con-
trolled substance, be subjected to the collateral consequences of a felony con-
viction and face up to four years in prison. Nor should individuals with serious 
drug and mental health issues be warehoused in state prisons without receiving 
the treatment they need. This sort of punishment drains the state’s budget, cre-
ates a vicious cycle of recidivism, and does not accomplish the system’s crimi-
nal justice goals. As a state, we have taken a step forward, but it is up to all of 
us to keep walking. 
